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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BILLIE PETERSON, • 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
UTAH FARM BUREAU INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant/Appel1ne. 
CAYW N<» ni\f\n?^-c\ 
P r i o r " 1 "*~v XT~ "• ° 
BRIEF \PPELLANT 
The Utah Suprx :H C^a> r > 
p u r s u a n t 
- ; u n s : i ! r : : ~~ ~^ t h i s m a t t e r 
r.uitter has been 
IF \ ;:i 1 c i: 
Rules of Appellate Pi: ocedure. ! . . 
Statement of Issues and Standard of Review 
II i III in d i n in |iii| i | j i < I i am ill in II in i l in I II I in iiii I Hi i i mi i i J m i , . ( i in II I "I I 11 
receive underinsuret' motorist benelits limn Utah Farm Bureau 
Insurance Company. 
111"" 11 H j-, I d '[• 111 a I r l u I M • s f I • •" w" i«1, mi in I I 11 II > i 111 «, M ' ( i i P 1 1 i 1 " i o n u I' * "i 
statute, tit question ol. Jaw, reviewed lot correctness. State v. 
Larsen. 865 P.2d ] 3 55, 13 57 (Utah 1 993); Schurtz v. BMW of North 
America, Inc. , 8111 i I 2;m ::i Ill Ill 0 8 ( I J I ,1 1 S £ Ill ) . 
Determinative Statutes 
Section 31A-22-305(8) through 31A-22-305(10). 
Statement of the Case 
Nature of the Case 
Billie Peterson was injured in a truck rollover on September 
6, 1993. The rollover was the fault of a co-employee. Mr. 
Peterson claimed underinsured motorist insurance benefits from the 
Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company. The benefits were denied due 
to the language in the Utah Worker's Compensation Act. 
Course of the Proceedings 
Mr. Peterson filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment 
that he was entitled to receive underinsured motorist benefits from 
his insurance carrier. His complaint was dismissed. 
Statement of Facts 
1. On September 6, 1993, Billie Peterson was employed by R&O 
Construction Company of Ogden, Utah. 
2. Mr. Peterson and a co-employee were assigned to a job site 
in Nevada. 
3. The co-employee was driving his private truck to the job 
site in Nevada. Mr. Peterson was a passenger in the truck. 
4. Both Mr. Peterson and the co-employee driver were being 
paid some wage compensation for their travel time. 
5. While driving west on 1-80 in Tooele County, the co-
employee apparently fell asleep at the wheel. The truck left the 
roadway and rolled. The driver was killed and Mr. Peterson was 
severely injured. 
6. At the time of his injury, Mr. Peterson was insured by 
Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company from which he had purchased 
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underinsured coverage in the amount of $25,000. 
7. Following his injury, Mr. Peterson made a claim upon the 
insurance company for payment of those underinsured benefits. 
8. The insurance company denied payment of the underinsured 
benefits saying Mr. Peterson's claim is barred by the exclusive 
remedy portion of the Utah Worker's Compensation Act, Section 35-1-
60, Utah Code Annotated. 
9. Mr. Peterson has contended that he is entitled to receive 
the underinsured motorist benefits under Sections 31A-2-305(8) 
through (10) and under the case of Neel v. State of Utah, 257 Ut. 
Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah 1995). 
10. Following briefing and argument, the trial court granted 
the insurance company's Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Mr. 
Peterson's claim. 
Summary of the Argument 
Under the holding in Neel v. State of Utah, 257 Ut. Adv. Rep. 
20 (Utah 1995) and the statutory language of Section 31A-22-305 (8) 
through (10), Mr. Peterson was entitled to receive underinsured 
motorist coverage benefits as a result of the injuries he sustained 
on September 6, 1995. 
Argument 
Plaintiff had purchased underinsured motorist coverage through 
Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company. Under Utah law underinsured 
coverage is available whenever there is "insufficient liability 
coverage to compensate fully the injured party for all special and 
general damages." U.C.A., Section 31A-22-305 (8) . And, it is the 
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clear intent of the statute that this type of coverage be "added 
to, combined with, or stacked upon the liability coverage of the 
owner or operator of the underinsured motor vehicle•" Section 31A-
22-305(9) (b) . Quite clearly it was the legislature's intent that 
these monies actually be paid. 
While the defendant is correct that some other states have 
denied recovery in similar circumstances, this outcome is not 
universal under general law principles and the cited cases are not 
controlling in this instance, because the specific language of the 
Utah underinsured statute and case law interpreting that statute 
are different, requiring a different result. 
In the Utah case of Neel v. State of Utah, 257 Utah. Adv. Rep. 
2 0 (Utah 1995), the court held that the exclusive remedy provision 
of the Workers' Compensation Statute did not bar an injured 
worker's recovery of personal injury protection benefits under a 
motor vehicle insurance policy. The decision was based on the 
particular wording of the Utah No-Fault Act. The court stated 
that: 
Had the legislature intended PIP insurers to 
have an absolute defense against injured 
employees, lawmakers could have easily added 
language to the Statute indicating this 
intent. Interestingly, in wording the 
uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage 
statute, the legislature did that very thing 
by adding this language: *This coverage does 
not apply to an employee, who is injured by an 
uninsured motorist, whose exclusive remedy is 
provided by Title 35, Chapter 1, Worker's 
Compensation.' No similar language is 
included in the PIP statute . . . 
Id. at 22. 
The Neel decision is, however, on a close reading, favorable 
to and determinative of plaintiffs claim in this case. The 
statutory language cited by the court evidencing the legislative 
intent that the exclusive remedy provision apply to uninsured 
motorist benefits solely applied to uninsured benefits, not 
underinsured benefits. The plain language of that portion of the 
statute clearly reflects this, as noted above by the emphasized 
notation uninsured in a quote above. In subsections (8) through 
(10) of the statute, which particularly address underinsured 
benefits, no similar provision is found. Therefore, under the 
court's reasoning in Neel, the absence of language providing for 
the exclusive remedy defense is determinative of a legislative 
intent that the defense does not apply in underinsured situations. 
There is no language in the underinsured portion of the statute 
suggesting the exclusive remedy provision bars recovery. Further, 
the only reference to the exclusive remedy provision explicitly 
states it applies to uninsured coverage, not underinsured coverage. 
The language in Neel suggesting that the exclusive remedy 
provision applies to underinsured as well as uninsured benefits is 
simply careless writing on the part of the court. The language the 
court refers to clearly applies on its face to uninsured coverage. 
The provisions dealing with underinsured coverage do not contain an 
explicit reference to the applicability of the exclusive remedy 
provision. The absence of such an explicit reference in the PIP 
statute was the basis of the court's holding that exclusive remedy 
provision did not apply to PIP benefits. Similarly, the exclusive 
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remedy provision cannot apply to underinsured motorist benefits 
under U.C.A., Section 31A-22-305, because the necessary language is 
absent. 
Concerning the issue of plaintiff/s claim against Mr. 
Clifford, the courts in Oklahoma have specifically addressed this 
question. See Barfield v. Barfield, 742 P.2d 1107 (Okl. 1987) and 
Torres v. Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins., 849 P.2d 407 (Okl. 1993). 
In Torres, the Oklahoma Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its 
earlier holding that an injured worker who is also insured under an 
underinsured motor vehicle insurance policy is entitled to recover 
underinsured benefits "even though the negligent tortfeasor was a 
co-employee immune under the worker's compensation law." The court 
explained that "the phrase legally entitled to recover damages 
simply means the insured must be able to establish fault on the 
part of the uninsured motorist which gives rise to damages and 
prove the extent of those damages." Id. at 410. Further the court 
noted that the "overriding determination in our view is whether the 
party attempting to recover under the UM endorsement is an insured 
under the policy . . ." Id. at 411. Finally, the court also 
stated that: 
the intention was the UM coverage would be 
available once it was determined that the 
party seeking coverage was an insured under 
the policy, that the uninsured tortfeasor 
causing damage was at fault and the extent of 
those damages was shown. 
Id. at 412. 
The holding of the Oklahoma court is consistent with the 
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public policy determination of the Utah legislature that all 
injured motorists in this state should have available to them 
underinsured coverage regardless of the employment relationship 
existing between the injured person as the at-fault driver. 
Conclusion 
Given the particular language of Section 31A-22-305(8) through 
(10), Mr. Peterson was entitled to receive, from Utah Farm Bureau, 
underinsured motorist benefits. 
DATED this ^(J day o f ^ ^ ^ ^ L ^ ^ 199^. 
MARQUARDT, H^SENYAGER & CUSTEN 
fi&*^, 
ES R. H^ CS EN YAGER 
ttorney for Appella 
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JAMES R. HASENYAGER 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN LC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2408 Van Buren Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-3 662 
Utah State Bar No. 1404 
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
BILLIE PETERSON, : DOCKETING STATEMENT 
(subject to assignment to the 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Utah Court of Appeals) 
vs. : 
UTAH FARM BUREAU INSURANCE : 
COMPANY, 
Defendant/Appellee. Case No. 
1. Date of Entry of Judgment or Order Appealed From: October 
10, 1995. 
2. Nature of Post-Judgment Motions and Date Filed: None. 
3. Date and Effect of Orders Disposing of Post-Judgment 
Motion: Not applicable. 
4. Date of Filing of Notice of Appeal: October 13, 1995. 
5. Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated. 
6. Name of Trial Court: This is an appeal from the Third 
Judicial District Court of Tooele County, the Honorable John 
Rokich, District Court Judge. 
7. Statement of Facts: 
A. On September 6, 1993, Billie Peterson was employed by 
R&O Construction Company of Ogden, Utah. 
Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co. 
Page 2 
B. Mr. Peterson and a co-employee were assigned to a job 
site in Nevada. 
C. The co-employee was driving his private truck to the 
job site in Nevada. Mr. Peterson was a passenger in the truck. 
D. Both Mr. Peterson and the co-employee driver were 
being paid some wage compensation for their travel time. 
E. While driving west on 1-80 in Tooele County, the co-
employee apparently fell asleep at the wheel. The truck left the 
roadway and rolled. The driver was killed and Mr. Peterson was 
severely injured. 
F. At the time of his injury, Mr. Peterson was insured 
by Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company from which he had purchased 
underinsured coverage in the amount of $25,000. 
G. Following his injury, Mr. Peterson made a claim upon 
the insurance company for payment of those underinsured benefits. 
H. The insurance company denied payment of the 
underinsured benefits saying Mr. Peterson's claim is barred by the 
exclusive remedy portion of the Utah Worker's Compensation Act, 
Section 35-1-60, Utah Code Annotated. 
I. Mr. Peterson has contended that he is entitled to 
receive the underinsured motorist benefits under Sections 31A-2-
3 05(8) through (10) and under the case of Neel v. State of Utah, 
257 Ut. Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah 1995). 
J. Following briefing and argument, the trial court 
granted the insurance company's motion for summary judgment 
Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co. 
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dismissing Mr. Peterson's claim. 
8. Issues for Review and Standard of Review: 
A. Whether Mr. Peterson is entitled, in these 
circumstances, to receive underinsured motorist benefits from Utah 
Farm Bureau Insurance Company. 
B. The Standard for Review is in the interpretation of 
a statute, a question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993); Schurtz v. BMW of North 
America. Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). 
9. Determinative Statutes and Case Law: Sections 31A-22-305 
(8) through (10); Neel v. State of Utah. 257 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 
(Utah 1995). 
10. There have been no prior appeals in this case. 
DATED this ^ day otA/^K£^c/!^ , 1995. 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
/fAMES R. HASENYAG 
Attorney for Plai 
Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
********************** 
I hereby certify that on this />- day of November, 
1995, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Docketing Statement, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Stephen G. Morgan 
Mitchell T. Rice 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
13 6 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
SECRETARYfl 
ADDENDUM B 
RECtlVtU our I W W 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PETERSON, BILLIE 
VS 
PLAINTIFF 
UTAH FARM BUREAU INSURANCE CO 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 950300029 PI 
DATE 09/19/95 
HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK RGB 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. HASENYAGER, JAMES R 
D. ATTY. STEPHEN G. MORGAN 
NOTICE OF DECISION: 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED FOR 
THE REASONS SET FORTH IN DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM. 
DEFENDANT WILL PREPARE AN ORDER CONSISTENT WITH THE 
RULING OF THE COURT. C/C COUNSEL 
ADDENDUM C 
JAMES R. HASENYAGER 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN LC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
24 08 Van Buren Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 844 01 
Telephone: (801) 621-3662 
Utah State Bar No. 1404 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOLE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BILLIE PETERSON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH FARM BUREAU INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 950300029 
Judge: John Rokich 
Notice is hereby given that plaintiff/appellant, Billie 
Peterson, through counsel James R. Hasenyager of the firm 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN, appeals to the Utah Court of 
Appeals the Order Granting Defendant Utah Farm Bureau Insurance 
Company's Motion for Summary Judgment signed by the Honorable John 
Rokich on October 10, 1995. /f 
DATED this /J^day of/ / / f f l ^ 1995. 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER. & CUSTEN 
-M& sti 
7 
fcf£^ 
R. HASENYAGER 
ttorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
********************** 
I hereby certify that on this ) day of October, 
1995, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Notice of Appeal, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Stephen G. Morgan 
Mitchell T. Rice 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
13 6 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
[lh\ 1/IAlf 
S E C R E T A R Y ^ j * 
JAMES R. HASENYAGER 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN LC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2408 Van Buren Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-3662 
Utah State Bar No. 1404 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BILLIE PETERSON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH FARM BUREAU INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 950300029 
Judge: John Rokich 
Notice is hereby given that plaintiff/appellant, Billie 
Peterson, through counsel James R. Hasenyager of the firm 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court 
the Order Granting Defendant Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company's 
Motion for Summary Judgment signed by the Honorable John Rokich on 
October 10, 1995. 
DATED this ^ day of / ^ ? W W ^ 7 , 1995. 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
TAMES R. HASENYAGER 
/ /Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Page 2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
********************** 
I hereby certify that on this ^ ' day of November, 
1995, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Notice of Appeal, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Stephen G. Morgan 
Mitchell T. Rice 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
13 6 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BILLIE PETERSON. 
(Plaintiff/Appellant) 
vs. 
UTAH FARM BUREAU INSURANCE 
COMPANY. 
(Defendant/Appellee) 
BOND NO. 29-1104353 
UNDERTAKING 
FOR COST ON APPEAL 
Civil No. 950300029 PI 
Judge: John Rokich 
WHEREAS, the above-named plaintiff/appellant desires to give an undertaking for COST ON APPEAL as provided 
by Section 63-30-19 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
NOW, THEREFORE, Old Republic Surety Company, a corporation duly licensed to do business in the State of Utah, as 
Surety, does hereby obligate itself, its successors and assigns to the above named defendant/appellee under said statutory obligations 
in the sum of THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS and NO/100 ($300.00**) 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah the 12th day of October , 1995. 
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY 
/J* N* \ 
\ ^ / * V BY: /fe^^J 
Its: Kathleen Fowler, Attorney-in-Fact 
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: ^ t & b £ £fl OT^M^rC H f&mMf:^^ M<0^Mfyf 
its true and lawful Attprney(s)-jn-:Fact, with full r ^ ^ and^authonljr for ancLorKbehall; pfth&^rnpany a s , s u r ^ J o ^ e c u ^ p deliver andiaffijcHtfte s^L-pf ihe 
company thereto (ifa s^af is required], bonf^;unf^r3|^^yrer^nizanc^s or #^»^^^WigatiOTsHn the n^Mh^e;o(^heOh|ri ba i r^c^^^^M^^si fer f 
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ADDENDUM D 
IINOUXvr*r* 
jlf-insurance, uninsured motorist coverage of at least 
25,000 per person and $500,000 per accident. 
(i) This coverage is secondary to any other insur-
ance covering an injured covered person. 
(ii) This coverage does not apply to an employee, 
who is injured by an uninsured motorist, whose 
exclusive remedy is provided by Title 35, Chapter 1, 
Workers' Compensation, 
(c) As used in this subsection: 
(i) "Governmental entity" has the same meaning 
as under Section 63-30-2. 
(ii) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as under 
Section 41-la-102. 
When a covered person alleges that an uninsured motor 
le under Subsection (2Xb) proximately caused an acci-
without touching the covered person or the vehicle 
led by the covered person, the covered person must show 
xistence of the uninsured motor vehicle by clear and 
ncing evidence consisting of more than the covered 
n's testimony. 
(a) The limit of liability for uninsured motorist coverage 
or two or more motor vehicles may not be added together, 
ombined, or stacked to determine the limit of insurance 
overage available to an injured person for any one 
iccident. 
(b) (i) Subsection (a) applies to all persons except a 
covered person as denned under Subsection (7XbXii). 
(ii) A covered person as defined under Subsection 
(7XbXii) is entitled to the highest limits of uninsured 
motorist coverage afforded for any one vehicle that 
the covered person is the named insured or an in-
sured family member. 
(iii) This coverage shall be in addition to the cov-
erage on the vehicle the covered person is occupying. 
(iv) Neither the primary nor the secondary cover-
age may be set off against the other. 
(c) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of 
an accident shall be primary coverage, and the coverage 
elected by a person described under Subsections (lXa) and 
(b) shall be secondary coverage. 
) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under this section ap-
plies to bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death of covered 
persons while occupying or using a motor vehicle only if 
the motor vehicle is described in the policy under which a 
claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a newly acquired 
or replacement vehicle covered under the terms of the 
policy. Except as provided in Subsection (6) or (7), a 
covered person injured in a vehicle described in a policy 
that includes uninsured motorist benefits may not elect to 
collect uninsured motorist coverage benefits from any 
other motor vehicle insurance policy under which he is a 
covered person. 
(b) Each of the following persons may also recover 
uninsured motorist benefits under any other policy in 
which they are described as a "covered person" as defined 
in Subsection (1): 
(i) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an 
uninsured motor vehicle; and 
(ii) a covered person injured while occupying or 
using a motor vehicle that is not owned by, furnished, 
or available for the regular use of the covered person, 
the covered person's resident spouse, or the covered 
person's resident relative. 
(c) A covered person in Subsection (7Xb) is not barred 
against making subsequent elections if recovery is un-
available under previous elections. 
8) (a) As used in this section, "underinsured motor ve-
hicle" includes a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or 
use of which is covered under a liability policy at the time 
of an injury-causing occurrence, but which has insuffi-
cient liability coverage to compensate fully the injured 
party for all special and general damages. 
(b) The term "underinsured motor vehicle" does not 
include: 
(i) a motor vehicle that is covered under the liabil-
ity coverage of the same policy that also contains the 
underinsured motorist coverage; or 
(ii) an uninsured motor vehicle as defined in Sub-
section (2). 
(9) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under Subsection 
31A-22-302(lXc) provides coverage for covered persons 
who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners 
or operators of underinsured motor vehicles because of 
bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death in limits of at 
least $10,000 for one person in any one accident, and at 
least $20,000 for two or more persons in any one accident. 
(b) The named insured's underinsured motorist cover-
age, as described in Subsection (9Xa), is secondary to the 
liability coverage of an owner or operator of an 
underinsured motor vehicle, as described in Subsection 
(8). Underinsured motorist coverage may not be set off 
against the liability coverage of the owner or operator of 
an underinsured motor vehicle, but shall be added to, 
combined with, or stacked upon the liability coverage of 
the owner or operator of the underinsured motor vehicle 
to determine the limit of coverage available to the injured 
person. 
(c) (i) For new policies or contracts written after Janu-
ary 1, 1993, a named insured may reject 
underinsured motorist coverage by an express writ-
ing to the insurer that provides liability coverage 
under Subsection 31A-22-302 (lXa). This rejection 
continues for that issuer of the liability coverage until 
the insured in writing requests underinsured motor-
ist coverage from that liability insurer. 
(ii) In conjunction with the first three renewal 
notices sent after January 1, 1993, for policies exist-
ing on that date, the insurer shall notify the insured 
of the availability of underinsured motorist coverage 
along with estimated ranges of premiums for the 
coverage. The department shall provide standard 
language to be used by insurers to fulfill the insurers' 
duty under this subsection. 
(10) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under this section 
applies to bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death of an 
insured while occupying or using a motor vehicle owned 
by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the 
insured, a resident spouse, or resident relative of the 
insured, only if the motor vehicle is described in the policy 
under which a claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a 
newly acquired or replacement vehicle covered under the 
terms of the policy. Except as provided in Subsection (10), 
a covered person injured in a vehicle described in a policy 
that includes underinsured motorist benefits may not 
elect to collect underinsured motorist coverage benefits 
from any other motor vehicle insurance policy under 
which he is a named insured. 
(b) (i) The limit of liability for underinsured motorist 
coverage for two or more motor vehicles may not be 
added together, combined, or stacked to determine 
the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured 
person for any one accident. 
(ii) Subsection (bXi) applies to all persons except a 
covered person as defined under Subsection (cXiXB). 
(iii) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the 
time of an accident shall be primary coverage, and 
the coverage elected by a person described under 
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Sue NEEL, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
STATE of Utah, Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 940282. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 2, 1995. 
State employee who was injured in car 
accident while riding in state-owned car in 
course of her employment brought action to 
recover personal injury protection (PIP) ben-
efits against the state, as self-insurer. The 
Second District Court, Weber County, dis-
missed action, and employee appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Bench, J., 854 P.2d 581, 
reversed and remanded. The Second Dis-
trict Court, Stanton M. Taylor, J., entered 
summary judgment for state, and employee 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Howe, J., 
held that workers' compensation exclusivity 
provision did not bar action, oveiruling IML 
Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Appeal and Error <S=*842(2) 
Because parties raised only questions of 
law, Supreme Court would give trial court's 
legal conclusions no deference and would re-
view them for correctness. 
2. Insurance <£=>467.61(4) 
Whether employee is entitled to person-
al injury protection (PIP) benefits cannot 
turn on employer's decision to secure private 
insurance or to self-insure. U.C.A.1953, 41 -
12a-407(2). 
3. Insurance ®=>532.5(3) 
Where automobile accident is covered by 
both workers' compensation and no-fault in-
surance, statute providing that personal inju-
ry protection (PIP) benefits are payable to 
injured employee but are reduced by benefits 
which he receives under workers' compensa-
tion permits no-fault insurer to exclude some 
liability, that which is compensable under 
workers' compensation, but not all liability; 
overruling IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 
P.2d 296. U.C.A.1953, 31A-22-309(3)(a). 
4. Statutes <^174 
Supreme Court has no power to rewrite 
statute to make it conform to an intention not 
expressed. 
5. Workers' Compensation <£=>2084 
Workers' compensation exclusivity provi-
sion did not bar action for personal injury 
protection (PIP) benefits under Automobile 
No-Fault Insurance Act brought against 
State, as self-insurer, by state employee who 
was injured in car accident while riding in 
state-owned car in course of her employment. 
6. Insurance <3=*532.5(3) 
No-fault insurers, including self-insur-
ers, are required to pay personal injury pro-
tection (PIP) benefits to injured employees 
to extent that those benefits exceed workers' 
compensation benefits. 
7. Insurance <3=>138(4) 
Although state's self-insurance program 
excludes personal injury protection (PIP) 
benefits to any person entitled to workers' 
compensation benefits, this exclusion is not in 
harmony with statutory requirements and is, 
therefore, invalid. U.C.A.1953, 31A-22-
309(3)(a). 
Daniel L. Wilson, Ogden, for plaintiff. 
Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., Brent A. Burnett, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for defen-
dant. 
HOWE, Justice: 
Plaintiff Sue Neel brought this action 
against her employer, the State of Utah, to 
collect personal injury protection ("PIP") 
benefits under Utah's Automobile No-Fault 
Insurance Act. The State initially moved to 
dismiss the complaint for failure to comply 
with the requirements of the Governmental 
Immunity Act. The trial court granted the 
motion without prejudice. On appeal, the 
Utah Court of Appeals held that because the 
action sounded in contract, the procedural 
requirements of the immunity act did not 
NEEL v 
Cite as 889 P.2d 
apply. Neel v. State, 854 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah 
CtApp.1993). 
On remand, the State filed a motion for 
summary judgment, contending that Neel 
was barred from seeking PIP benefits from 
the State by the exclusive remedy provision 
of the Workers' Compensation Act. The dis-
trict court granted the motion on that basis, 
and Neel appeals. 
I. FACTS 
Neel was injured in a car accident in De-
cember 1990 while riding in a state-owned 
car in the course of her employment with the 
State. The State paid her all the workers' 
compensation benefits to which she was enti-
tled. In this action, she seeks PIP benefits 
to the extent those benefits were not covered 
by workers' compensation, including reim-
bursement for loss of household services, sec-
ond-job wage loss, and the difference be-
tween wage reimbursement under workers' 
compensation (seventy percent of lost wages) 
and under PIP (eighty-five percent of lost 
wages). See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307. 
She contends that she is entitled to these 
benefits under section 31A-22-309(3) of the 
code, which provides, "The benefits payable 
to any injured person under [the PIP stat-
ute] are reduced by: (a) any benefits which 
that person receives or is entitled to receive 
as a result of an accident covered in this code 
under . . . workers' compensation " 
At the time of the accident and all other 
dates relevant to this action, the State self-
insured its motor vehicles as permitted by 
statute. See § 41-12a-301(4). The State's 
self-insurance program expressly excluded 
from coverage "bodily injury to any person 
who is entitled to payments or benefits under 
the provisions of Utah's Workers' Compensa-
tion Law." 
II. ANALYSIS 
[1] The facts are not in dispute. Because 
the parties raise only questions of law, this 
court gives the trial court's legal conclusions 
no deference and reviews them for correct-
ness. West Valley City Corp. v. Salt Lake 
County, 852 P.2d 1000, 1002 (Utah 1993). 
. STATE Utah 923 
922 (Utah 1995) 
This case confronts an apparent conflict 
between Utah's no-fault and workers' com-
pensation statutes. The No-Fault Act re-
quires that "[ejvery policy of insurance or 
combination of policies, purchased to satisfy 
the owner's or operator's security require-
ment of Section 41-12a-301 . . . shall also 
include personal injury protect ion. . . ." 
§ 31A-22-302(2) (emphasis added). Section 
41-12a-301(3)(a) declares that "the state . . . 
shall maintain owner's or operator's security 
in effect continuously for their motor vehi-
cles." Thus the State, along with all other 
employers, is required to have PIP coverage 
on its motor vehicles. 
Meanwhile, the Workers' Compensation 
Act provides: 
The right to recover compensation pursu-
ant to the provisions of this title for inju-
ries sustained by an employee . . . shall be 
the exclusive remedy against the employer 
. . . and the liabilities of the employer im-
posed by this act shall be in place of any 
and all other civil liability whatsoever, at 
common law or otherwise, to the employ-
e e . . . . 
§ 35-1-60 (emphasis added). Hence, while 
one statute requires every auto insurance 
policy—including those held by employers— 
to include PIP coverage, the other statute 
arguably bars injured employees from recov-
ering any benefits from that coverage. 
A. IML Freight 
This is not an issue of first impression for 
this court. Nearly two decades ago, we de-
cided a declaratory judgment action based on 
this same conflict. IML Freight, Inc. v. 
Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296 (Utah 1975). Neel 
argues that IML Freight merely addressed 
the instant issue in dicta. However, a review 
of the briefs filed by the parties in that case 
and a careful reading of the opinion itself 
have led us to conclude otherwise. 
IML Freight arose when employees of an 
interstate trucking company filed cfaims 
against the company, requesting no-fault 
benefits. The company filed an action to 
cietermine its responsibilities to comply with 
the no-fault statute and, more specifically, 
Whether the workers' compensation exclusivi-
ty clause barred injured employees from ob-
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taming benefits from their employers' no-
fault coverage 
The court framed the issue in terms of 
whether the exclusivity provision "was re-
pealed by the No-Fault concept " Id at 297 
The court discussed the histoi ical importance 
of the exclusive i emedy of workei s' compen-
sation and reasoned that discrimination 
would lesult if an employee injured in a 
motor vehicle could recover more benefits 
than an employee mjui ed in another manner 
Id With little other discussion, the court 
held as follows 
We believe and hold that the language 
used by the legislature [in the no-fault 
statute] did not impose upon an employer 
subject to the Workmen's Compensation 
Act, the heart-beat of which is exclusive-
ness of remedy, any additional burden per-
sonally to pay any injured employee extra, 
who happened to drive a motor vehicle, as 
against fellow employees who happened to 
push dock dollies or ride cranes to their 
injury or death 
Id (emphasis added) 
[2] We find a number of problems with 
this reasoning and holding First, the word 
"personally" in the holding implies that al-
though an employer need not personally pay 
PIP benefits, perhaps the employer's private 
no-fault insurer would have to do so See 2A 
Aithur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Com 
pensation k 7124(e), at 14-69 n 4 (1994) 
(citing IML Freight and speculating that its 
holding may apply onl> to self-insurer) 
Whethei an employee is entitled to PIP ben-
efits cannot turn on the employers decision 
to secure pnvate insurance oi to self-insure 
See § 41-12a-407(2) (self-insurers "shall pay 
benefits to persons injured from the self-
funded person's operation, maintenance, and 
use of motoi vehicles as would an insurer 
issuing a policy to the self-funded person"), 
Neel v State, 854 P 2d 581, 584 (Utah Ct 
Appl993) ("The State's election to self-in-
suie cannot become a stumbling block to the 
swift recovery of PIP benefits ") Although 
parts of IML Freight can be read to clarify 
the coui t's use of the word "personally," the 
holding remains confusing 
The court's discnmination-of-workers theo-
ry is also troubling It ignores the legisla-
ture's requirement that no-fault coverage ap-
ply to "[ejvery policy of [auto) insurance" 
§ 31A-22-302(2) Thus, contiary to IML 
Freight, the no-fault statute effectively im-
posed upon all owners of motoi vehicles— 
including employers—an additional burden to 
buy PIP coveiage for then vehicles 
The legislature chose to legulate this as-
pect of insurance for all owners of motor 
vehicles, including employers who own the 
motor vehicles used in their businesses 
This can hardly be deemed discrimination. 
"[0]ur legislature has the power and duty to 
promote the public health, safety, and gener-
al welfare of all citizens In furtherance of 
that power and duty, conditions and regula-
tions for the operation of motor vehicles on 
our public roads and highways are a proper 
subject for legislative action " State v Ste 
vens, 718 P2d 398, 399 (Utah 1986) (per 
curiam) (footnote omitted) Indeed, the only 
discrimination that is involved here arises 
from IML Freight One who is injured in a 
motor vehicle accident and is coveied by 
workers' compensation is entitled to less ben-
efits than another who is also injured in such 
an accident but is not covered by workers' 
compensation 
B Utah Code Ann § 3lA-22-309(3) 
The most troubling aspect of IML Freight 
is its cursory tieatment of the statute that 
directly confronts this issue The no-fault 
statute explicitly pi ovides, "The benefits pay-
able to any injuied person under [the PIP 
statute] are reduced by (a) any benefits 
which that person receives or is entitled to 
receive as a result of an accident coveied in 
this code under any workei s' compensation 
or similar statutory plan " § 31A-22-
309(3) At the time IML Freight was decid-
ed, the substantially identical statute was 
numbered at section 31-41-7(3) (Supp 1973) 
IML Fieight mentions the statute only in 
passing 
If there be an argument that the No-
Fault Act supeisedes the Woikmen s Com-
pensation Act because it allows foi deduc-
tion of Workmen's Compensation pay-
ments from a No-Fault insurance judg-
ment or settlement, constitutionally it 
NEEL v 
Cite as 889 P.2d 
would appear to be flattened, since the 
added compensation thus afforded obvious-
ly would discriminate in favor of one type 
of employee, at the expense of an employ-
er, and to the exclusion of others. 
IML Freight, 538 P.2d at 297. We disagree 
with this analysis. 
"The court's principal duty in interpreting 
statutes is to determine legislative intent, 
and the best evidence of legislative intent is 
the plain language of the statute." Sullivan 
v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 853 P.2d 877, 
879 (Utah 1993) (citing Jensen v. Intermoun-
tain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 
(Utah 1984)). "[W]e presume that the Legis-
lature used each term advisedly, and we give 
effect to each term according to its ordinary 
and accepted meaning." Versluis v. Guaran-
ty Nat'l Cos., 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992). 
[3] The plain language of section 31A-
22-309(3)(a) indicates that the legislature 
considered the very issue that is at hand in 
this case and decided that PIP benefits are 
payable to an injured employee but that 
these benefits are reduced by "any benefits 
which that person receives . . . under . . . 
workers' compensation." In other words, an 
injured party should be able to receive PIP 
benefits to the extent that those benefits are 
not already paid by workers' compensation. 
The court of appeals has already so inter-
preted the statute: 
We interpret [section 31A-22-309(3)(a) ] as 
expressing the legislature's determination 
that, as between a no-fault insurer and a 
workers' compensation insurer . . . , the no-
fault insurer should not bear the burden of 
paying the benefits due to an employee 
accidently injured in the course of employ-
ment even if that injury occurred in a 
vehicle covered by the requisite no-fault 
insurance. Accordingly, the no-fault in-
surer is permitted by this statute to ex-
clude from coverage provided under its 
insurance policy any liability for injuries 
that are compensable under the workers' 
compensation statute 
Bevans v. Industrial Comm'n, 790 P.2d 573, 
577 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (emphasis added). 
Thus where an accident is covered by both 
workers' compensation and no-fault insur-
ance, the statute permits a no-fault insurer to 
. STATE Utah 925 
922 (Utah 1995) 
exclude some liability—that which is compen-
sable under workers' compensation—but not 
all liability. 
In oral argument, the State contended that 
the PIP statute was intended to benefit only 
employees driving their own vehicles, not 
employees driving their employers' vehicles. 
This strained interpretation would have us 
read language into an otherwise unambigu-
ous statute. The State cites no authority for 
this assertion, and our own research has not 
uncovered any case supporting this theory. 
Although there is some split of authority 
on whether the exclusive remedy clause bars 
an action by employees against their employ-
ers' no-fault insurance, the division is primar-
ily due to the differing language of the vari-
ous no-fault statutes. See 2A Arthur Larson, 
The Law of Workmen's Compensation 
§ 71.24(e), at 14-68 (1994); Vitauts M. Gul-
bis, Annotation, Validity and Construction of 
No-Fault Insurance Plans Providing for 
Reduction of Benefits Otherwise Payable by 
Amounts Receivable From Independent Col-
lateral Sources, 10 A.L.R.4th 996, 1010-13 
(1981). 
No split of authority appears, however, in 
states whose no-fault statutes specifically 
provide that PIP benefits will be reduced by 
workers' compensation benefits as does sec-
tion 31A-22-309(3)(a). These states have 
uniformly allowed both types of benefits. 
See, e.g., Tate v. Industrial Claim Appeals 
Office, 815 P.2d 15, 19 (Colo.1991) ("This 
provision coordinates the workers' compensa-
tion and PIP benefits so that the injured 
person does not receive duplicate benefits."); 
Brown v. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co., 247 
Ga. 287, 275 S.E.2d 651, 652 (1981) (declining 
to go against clear statutory language to 
deny PIP benefits to injured employee); All-
state Ins. Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co of Michigan, 
175 Mich.App. 157, 437 N.W.2d 338, 339 
(1989) (statute's purpose "is to reduce the 
basic cost of insurance by requiring a set-off 
of those government benefits [including 
workers' compensation] that duplicate no-
fault benefits and coordinating those benefits 
a victim may receive"); Carriers Ins. Co. v. 
Burakowski, 93 Misc.2d 100, 402 N.Y.S.2d 
333, 334 (1978) (declining to go against clear 
statutory language to deny PIP benefits to 
injured employee). 
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This interpretation is consistent with that 
of a respected insurance law treatise: 
A provision of the no-fault law permitting 
an offset of benefits received under work-
er's compensation laws rather than the 
total disqualification of employed persons, 
is the customary approach. Thus, while 
the PIP insurer has no absolute defense, it 
mat/ receive a credit for the compensation 
payments which have been received. 
8D John A. Appleman, Insurance Law and 
Practice ^ 5187, at 574-75 (1981) (footnotes 
omitted) (emphasis added).1 
[4J Had the legislature intended PIP in-
surers to have an absolute defense against 
injured employees, lawmakers could have 
easily added language to the statute indicat-
ing this intent Interestingly, in wording the 
uninsured and undennsured motorist cover-
age statute, the legislature did that very 
thing by adding this language: "This cover-
age does not apply to an employee, who is 
injured by an uninsured motorist, whose ex-
clusive remedy is provided by Title 35, Chap-
ter 1, Workers' Compensation." § 31A-22-
305(4)(b)(n) No similar language is included 
in the PIP statutes, and we have " 4no power 
to rewrite a statute to make it conform to an 
intention not expressed.'" In re Criminal 
Investigation, 754 P 2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988) 
(quoting Mountain States Tel S: Tel Co v 
Public Serv Connn'u, 107 Utah 502, 505, 155 
P.2d 184, 185 (Utah 1945)). 
Ill CONCLUSION 
[5, 6] This case is simply an action by an 
employee, Neel, against her employer's no-
fault insurer The State's designated insurer 
here is the State itself. The workers' com-
pensation exclusivity provision does not bar 
this action No-fault insurers, including self-
insurers, are required to pay PIP benefits to 
injured employees to the extent those bene-
fits exceed workers' compensation benefits. 
1. Mam cases cited b\ the paities a ie not persua-
sive because those iiinsdictions appa ren tk do 
not have statutes similar to section 3 I A - 2 2 -
309(3) that explain how the legislaluie intended 
insurers to coordinate no-fault and workers 
compensat ion benefits Sec en. (ridlett \ 
Btown M)7 Ark 18^ 820 S W 2d 4S7 4S9 
(I 99 I ) (wor ker ^ compensat ion e\clusivit\ clause 
barred claim for uninsured motorist benefits), 
CAM his to \ Lnhnan 222 Conn 769 610 A 2d 
1257 1260 (1992) (same) Affiliated FM his to 
In so holding, we overrule IML Freight 
insofar as it is inconsistent with this opinion. 
We are keenly aware of the doctrine of stare 
decisis and its importance as " 'a cornerstone 
of the Anglo-American jurisprudence that is 
crucial to the predictability of the law and 
the fairness of adjudication.' " State v. Men-
lies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (1994) (quoting State 
v. Thurnian, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 
1993)). However, in the case of IML 
Freight, we are " 'clearly convinced that the 
rule was originally erroneous and that 
more good than harm will come by departing 
from [its] precedent.' " Menzies, 889 P.2d at 
399 (quoting John Hanna, The Role of Prece-
dent in Judicial Decision, 2 Vill.L.Rev. 367, 
367 (1957)). 
[7] Although the State's self-insurance 
program excludes PIP benefits to any person 
entitled to workers' compensation benefits, 
this exclusion is not in harmony with statuto-
ry requirements and is therefore invalid. 
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call 712 P.2d 231, 233 
(Utah 1985) ("An insurer has the right to 
contract with an insured as to the risks it will 
or will not assume, as long as neither statuto-
ry law nor public policy is violated."); see 
also Ferro v. Utah Dept of Commerce, 828 
P.2d 507, 512 n. 7 (Utah Ct.App.1992) ('if an 
agency regulation is not in harmony with [a] 
statute, it is invalid."). 
We reverse the district court's grant of 
summary judgment and remand to the trial 
court for further proceedings. 
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., STEWART, 
Associate C.J., and DURHAM and 
RUSSON, JJ., concur. 
J^\ . 
( o § KtYNUMBEP SYSTEM > 
\ Giaiize Mm Casuuln Co 641 S W 2d 49, 51 
(K\ Ct App 1982) ( employers insurer liable for 
both workers compensat ion and basic repara-
tion benefits). Heavens \ Laclede Gas Co. 755 
S W 2d 331 333 (Mo Ct App 1988) (self-insured 
empkner required to provide both uninsured 
motons t coveiage and workers compensation to 
emplo\ee) . Fett\ i Libert\ Mut his Co, 392 
Pa Super S71. 573 A 2d 610, 612 (1990) (unin-
sured motorist benefits independent of workers' 
compensat ion) 
